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ABSTRACT 
The dual missions of the United States Secret Service, investigations and protection, 
appear to be without relationship or value to the other, and as a result, support and 
attention for the investigative mission has waned. This lack of attention to investigations 
is dangerous for the Secret Service and for the country it serves. To make this argument, 
this thesis attempts to determine whether the investigative mission is actually important 
to the successful performance of its protective mission.  
Through the use of a hybrid research methodology, with quantitative and 
qualitative aspects, this thesis argues that the types of investigations performed by the 
Secret Service are not as important as the experiential learning, respite from the hyper-
vigilance of protection, and surge capacity provided by the investigative mission. Since 
the investigative mission supports the protective mission in these three important ways, 
the Secret Service requires a robust, well-funded and substantial investigative mission to 
continue to properly provide protection to this nation’s leaders.   
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND  
The United States Secret Service (USSS) is a 145-year-old federal law 
enforcement agency, one of the oldest in the nation. While best known for its mission of 
protecting the President and other senior officials, the Secret Service was created in the 
Department of the Treasury at the end of the Civil War for the investigation of counterfeit 
currency. Regular protection of the nation’s leaders by the Secret Service did not begin 
until 1901, and Congress did not fund protection until several years later. For much of its 
history, the Secret Service was secure in its dual roles as an investigative and protection 
agency, and developed a strong tradition and reputation within the Treasury Department. 
The Secret Service continued as a Treasury agency until the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, when the Secret Service transferred, 
along with other agencies, into the new department. Since 2003, the Secret Service has 
worked to define and defend its missions within DHS.  
The Secret Service’s protective mission—maintaining security for U.S. national 
leaders, visiting heads of state and government, and designated sites and National Special 
Security Events—is clear and well supported within DHS. However, it is unclear whether 
the first mission of the Secret Service—to investigate and safeguard the nation’s financial 
infrastructure and payment systems and to preserve the integrity of the economy—is 
relevant to the stated missions of DHS. 
The Secret Service’s investigative mission does not fit clearly into any of the 
DHS stated missions in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2010b). The investigative budget of the Secret 
Service, while never very large, has not kept pace over the past few budget cycles with 




Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). This shortfall is due, in part, 
to the Secret Service’s inability to argue effectively for the need for this capability within 
DHS. 
While the DHS continues to develop its roles in prevention and disaster 
mitigation, including cyber crime and transnational threats to the U.S. economy, the 
Secret Service investigations of important financial and computer crimes is hindered by 
lack of attention and funding.  
Since the Secret Service is one of the primary federal government organizations 
devoted to the problem of financial and computer crime, this lack of attention to this 
important area of criminal activity could leave this nation’s financial stability at risk. 
According to Director Mark Sullivan’s recent testimony before Congress, in FY2010, the 
USSS efforts in combating financial crimes prevented an estimated 13.5 billion dollars in 
losses, of which 6.95 billion involved cyber crimes, which is “a reflection of the Secret 
Service’s ability to adapt to emerging financial and cyber crime threats” (United States 
Secret Service, 2011a). 
In addition and perhaps most importantly, the Secret Service argues that its 
investigative mission is not only complementary to its protective mission, but the 
investigative function is crucial to the efficiency and effectiveness of the protective 
responsibilities. Thus, the lack of focus on the investigative mission could have a 
negative impact on the ability of the Secret Service to execute its protective mission. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Is the investigative mission of the Secret Service of value to the protective 
mission? In what ways are the two missions complementary?  
C. HYPOTHESES  
The dual missions of the Secret Service, investigations and protection, have been 
in place for over 100 years. The dual missions appear to be independent, without 
relationship or value to the other, and as a result, support and attention for the less 
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glamorous investigative mission has waned. This thesis argues that this lack of attention 
to investigations is dangerous for the Secret Service and for the country it serves. To 
make this argument, this study attempts to determine whether the investigative mission of 
Secret Service is actually important to the successful performance of its protective 
mission.  
The March 2011 Atlantic Magazine included an article about the Secret Service in 
which an argument was made for the necessity of the investigative mission:  
We can’t have agents standing post all year” says Robert Sica, the Deputy 
Special Agent in Charge of the New York field office. “The investigations 
are what keep the agents’ minds sharp, which reinforces their 
effectiveness on protective details. The best protective agents are often the 
smartest ones, because they know how to read people. That comes from 
investigations.” It may be true that if you designed the entire national-
security apparatus from scratch, investigating financial crimes would fall 
outside the purview of the Secret Service. But from the agency’s point of 
view, its hybrid nature is a feature, not a bug. (Ambinder, 2011) 
In his 2011 testimony before the Committiee on Appropriations, Subcommittiee 
on Homeland Security, the Director of the Secret Service, Mark Sullivan stated: 
The partnerships that the Secret Service relies on to successfully perform 
our protection responsibilities are cultivated at the field office level. In 
addition to the permanent protective details dedicated solely to the 
protection of our nation’s leaders, the backbone of the Secret Service is 
our network of 142 domestic and 23 international investigative field 
offices. These offices carry out protective intelligence and financial crimes 
investigations while providing the surge capacity needed to successfully 
carry out the Secret Service’s protection responsibilities. 
All Secret Service Special Agents begin their career as a criminal 
investigator in a field office. The training, maturity and judgment they 
develop as criminal investigators in their field office assignments are 
essential for a successful transition into the next phase of their careers—
protecting our nation's leaders. During their time in the field, Special 
Agents are routinely assigned to temporary protective assignments. This 
developmental period enhances their skills in both the protective and 
investigative disciplines and promotes the philosophy of having a pool of 
well-trained and experienced agents capable of handling the Secret 
Service’s dual mission. Through conducting criminal investigations, 
special agents develop relationships with local, state and federal law 
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enforcement partners that prove critical when the President, Vice 
President, or other protectees visit their district. These relationships also 
enhance investigations into protective intelligence investigations against 
Secret Service protectees. (United States Secret Service, 2011a) 
From the above statements, it seems the USSS claims the investigative mission is 
important for several reasons. Sica indicates that investigations provide a respite from the 
rigors and hyper vigilant demands of protection. Sullivan is explicit in saying the 
experience agents gain conducting investigations is essential for a successful transition to 
protection. Sullivan makes additional assertions: liaison conducted by agents in 
investigations enhances the cooperation of other agencies when protection occurs in their 
district, and the agents assigned to the field provide a surge capacity needed to meet 
infrequent periods of extraordinary protection responsibilities, like the annual United 
General Assembly, the quadrennial presidential campaigns and National Special Security 
Events (NSSE). 
In addition to the primary research questions noted above, the author intends to 
address the following secondary research questions. 
• Does investigative experience provide competencies of value to protective 
tasks? 
• Does a need exist for a respite from protection assignments? 
• Does a need exist for a surge capacity of experienced and trained agents in 
the protective mission?  
• Do other investigative functions support the protective mission? 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
The DHS continues to mature and define its goals and purposes. As it goes 
through this process, each agency within the department is analyzing missions for 
relevance towards those goals. This thesis is an effort to analyze the missions of the 
Secret Service and quantify the need for the investigative mission.  
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E. RESEARCH METHOD 
The author conducts a program review of the investigative mission of the Secret 
Service and how investigative functions may support the protective mission. He intends 
to use a hybrid research methodology with quantitative and qualitative aspects by taking 
three different approaches. 
First, he intends to conduct a case study comparing the Secret Service policy of 
agent transfers between investigative assignments and protective assignments to the U.S. 
military policy of Army Force Generation or ARFORGEN. He suspects that just as the 
military has learned the importance of rotation of personnel from one assignment to 
another, and between arduous duties overseas and less tasking assignments at home, the 
Secret Service has benefitted from rotating its personnel between its two primary 
missions.  
Second, in 2007, the Secret Service contracted with a vendor to conduct a job 
analysis for Secret Service special agents. This study was designed to define the job of a 
special agent in terms of work performed and the individual characteristics and attributes 
required to perform that work. The goals of the analysis were to identify the tasks 
performed by special agents, identify the competencies and technical knowledge areas 
required for those tasks and provide job analytic data as the foundation for human 
resource practices (Swartout, O'Leary, & Pulakos, 2008). The author uses data from this 
study to link the competencies learned and practiced in an investigative assignment to the 
tasks required in protective assignments.  
In the author’s third approach, he intends to use statistics provided by the Secret 
Service’s Management and Organizational Division to evaluate periods of high protective 
demands on the Secret Service when the agents assigned to investigations are called upon 
in a surge capacity to support protective events. These statistics document the increase in 
reported protection manhours worked during significant protection events over the past 
decade, such as the annual United Nations General Assembly, the quadrennial 
presidential campaigns, and irregular events, such as the 2002 Winter Olympics, and  
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designated National Special Security events. He expects to use this information to argue 
the need for a trained cadre of agents within the Secret Service, ready to supplement the 
irregular protective requirements.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The available literature on the USSS and its roles in the DHS is relatively scarce. 
Some relevant literature concerning other federal law enforcement agencies, and even 
more on organizational transformation and adaptation does exist. The information 
available can be divided into four types.  
The first and most common are popular books and other accounts of the Secret 
Service. Most of these are historical and some attempt to be analytical, while all use 
anecdotes as a method of argument and proof. Second are Congressional and DHS 
reports that document government efforts at management and oversight of the Secret 
Service. Apparently, no scholarly papers or books directly address the issue of the Secret 
Service’s investigative mission. Many government reports relate to other federal law 
enforcement agencies much like those relating to the Secret Service. Also, a few 
scholarly papers address the challenges facing federal law enforcement in general and a 
few others focus on particular agencies. Finally, the volumes of work on organizational 
and government management provide general material and comparisons on the problems 
facing the Secret Service. The rest of this section reviews each of these categories in turn. 
A. POPULAR AND MASS MARKET BOOKS 
Many books on the history of the USSS provide great detail on the creation and 
evolution of the Secret Service. While most are historical in nature and attempt to present 
facts in an unbiased or positive light, a few are critical and attempt to provide an 
objective analysis of the Secret Service. All provide a fairly accurate history of the Secret 
Service. 
In his book, The Secret Service: The Hidden History of an Enigmatic Agency, 
Philip Melanson makes several recommendations for the future of the Secret Service. 
First, he states outside consultants should evaluate the Secret Service with an eye towards 
determining if its dual missions of financial crimes and protection are diminishing the 
quality of protection it provides. He then suggests that the Secret Service’s official 
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position, that the dual mission provides well rounded, and therefore, more effective 
agents, is flawed. He states the dual missions spread limited resources too thin to provide 
effective protection. He further argues the financial crimes mission of the Secret Service 
should have been left behind in the Department of Treasury when it was transferred to the 
DHS (Melanson & Stevens, 2002). 
In the book, In the Presidents Secret Service: Behind the Scenes with Agents in 
the Line of Fire and the Presidents they Protect, Ronald Kessler argues that the increase 
in protection duties after the events of 9/11 has led to shortcomings in the quality of the 
protection provided by the Secret Service. He claims that the management of the Secret 
Service should either ask for more resources with the expanding missions or shed some 
jurisdiction and responsibilities. He implies that other agencies could assume the 
financial investigations conducted by the service. He agrees that having agents exposed 
to investigations and protection provides intangible assets to the workforce, but argues 
that the Secret Service is attempting to maintain its posture towards financial crime 
investigations to the detriment of protective services (Kessler, 2009). 
In the book, Standing Next to History: An Agent’s Life inside the Secret Service, 
Joseph Petro says that the connection between the Secret Service’s investigations and 
protection is artificial and “based on a coincidence of history,” but then he further argues 
that the combination of missions contributes to the vitality of the Secret Service and 
attracts better applicants. He states that maintaining the dual mission should be the main 
objective of any Secret Service director. Petro voices his concern that “as the Department 
of Homeland Security matures, administrators will eventually move investigations out of 
the Secret Service into the Department of Justice and limit the Secret Service to a 
protection function. That will be damaging.” Petro does not further explore why this 
possible transfer of jurisdiction would be damaging (Petro & Robinson, 2005). 
While these works do identify some of the challenges and issues the USSS faces, 
they leave unanswered questions. One of the themes of each of these books, and one of 
the Secret Service’s major justifications for continuing the dual missions of the service, is 
the claim that investigations enhance the protective mission. The claim is not yet 
quantified and is unproven.  
 9 
B. CONGRESSIONAL AND DEPARTMENTAL REPORTS 
Many Congressional reports and transcripts concerning the Secret Service or the 
DHS exist, but very few discuss the roles of the Secret Service in relation to the DHS. 
Four important documents play a large role in the research for this thesis. First, the U.S. 
Secret Service Strategic Plan (FY2008–FY2013) lays out how the Secret Service 
perceives itself, its missions, goals, and how it intends to proceed. The second is the 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report, which lays out how the DHS perceives 
itself, its missions, its goals and how it intends to proceed. The third document is the 
Homeland Security Bottom Up Review (BUR) that determines areas in which gaps and 
shortcomings exist in the department’s efforts to meet its mandates. The fourth document 
is a Congressional Research Service Report, The U.S. Secret Service: an Examination 
and Analysis of its Evolving Missions (Reese, 2010). This report addresses issues directly 
related to important aspects of this thesis. The author briefly discusses each of these 
reports. 
In the United States Secret Service Strategic Plan FY2008–FY2013, the Secret 
Service describes its mission as “to safeguard the nation’s financial infrastructure and 
payment systems to preserve the integrity of the economy, and to protect national leaders, 
visiting heads of state and government, designated sites and National Special Security 
Events” (U.S. Secret Service, 2008). The plan further describes the Secret Service’s 
relationship to the DHS. Recognizing that the Secret Service is a component of the DHS, 
the plan claims the Secret Service plays a critical role in programs and initiatives that 
support DHS priorities, such as: “protecting the homeland from dangerous people and 
goods; protecting critical infrastructure; building a nimble, effective emergency response 
system and a culture of preparedness; and strengthening and unifying DHS operations 
and management” (U.S. Secret Service, 2008). 
According to this plan, the first strategic goal of the Secret Service is to protect 
the nation’s financial infrastructure, and the second goal is to protect the nation’s leaders, 
visiting heads of state, designated sites, and NSSE. The third goal is to enhance internal 
infrastructure and systems that sustain the dual missions. Part of this goal includes “a 
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robust dialogue with DHS” (U.S. Secret Service, 2008) and continued collaboration and 
information sharing with “DHS and its entities to support accomplishment of the 
departments goals” (U.S. Secret Service, 2008). 
In the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic framework for 
a Secure Homeland (Department of Homeland Security, 2010b), the DHS claims five 
main missions. The QHSR elaborates on the definition and objectives of each goal. The 
QHSR does not specifically mention the Secret Service or any other subordinate agency; 
however, a review of the goals does list as objectives some of the functions provided by 
the USSS. A review of these goals helps to indicate where the Secret Service fits into the 
overall missions that the DHS sees as most important. 
The first goal, preventing terrorism and enhancing security, includes protection of 
the nation’s leaders as a primary objective. The second goal, securing and managing our 
borders, lists the disruption of international criminal organizations engaged in cross 
border crimes as a primary objective. The USSS is active in the investigation of trans-
national electronic and financial crimes. The third goal, enforcing and administering U.S. 
immigration law, does not appear to touch on issues related to the USSS. The fourth goal, 
safeguarding and securing cyberspace, does address the prevention of cyber crimes as an 
objective. The USSS is one of several federal law enforcement agencies that claim cyber 
crime as a primary jurisdiction. The fifth goal, ensuring resilience to disasters, does not 
appear to touch on issues related to the USSS; however, the Secret Service’s involvement 
in the plans for the continuity of government and of the presidency may apply to this 
goal. 
It is important to note that, in the Appendix A of the QHSR, entitled Roles and 
Responsibilities of the Homeland Security Enterprise, the Secretary of the Treasury’s 
primary roles are described as safeguarding the U.S. financial system, combating 
“financial crimes, and cutting off financial support to terrorists, WMD proliferators, drug 
traffickers, and other national security threats” (Department of Homeland Security, 
2010b). 
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The DHS BUR (Department of Homeland Security, 2010a) is an effort by DHS to 
review its overall activities and structure in depth. It recognizes the difficulties of 
integrating the various entities into the new department and claims the QHSR and the 
BUR are deliberate and incremental steps toward “a more unified and integrated posture” 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2010a). The BUR states that the cornerstone of 
homeland security is the protection of the Unites States and its people from terrorism. 
One of the goals of this mission is “reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to 
terrorist attacks and other hazards.” It is under this goal that the USSS is specifically 
mentioned for its responsibilities of protecting the nation’s leaders, security planning for 
NSSEs, and criminal investigations relating to the financial system integrity and 
counterfeit currency. The USSS is not mentioned in DHS efforts to secure cyberspace or 
the investigation and prevention of computer crimes. This omission is an important point 
in that later in the BUR, DHS cites a need to “increase the focus and integration of DHS’s 
operational cyber security and infrastructure resilience activities” and “strengthen DHS 
ability to protect cyber networks” (Department of Homeland Security, 2010a, p. 26). 
The report for Congress by Shawn Reese of the Congressional Research Service, 
The U. S. Secret Service: An Examination and Analysis of its Evolving Missions, offers 
several policy questions about the mission and organization of the service: 
Mission 
1. Should Congress consider what is the optimum or preferred 
mission of the USSS and whether the mission should consist of 
both investigation and protection? 
2. Is the current allocation of resources, with the majority dedicated 
to the protection mission, appropriate?  
Organization 
1. Six years after the establishment or DHS, is this department the 
most appropriate administrative location for the USSS? 
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of alternative 
organizational arrangements, including the transfer of some 
functions and personnel back to the Treasury Department? (Reese, 
2010) 
 12 
This report also offers several options for the future of the service and its 
missions. One option would be to allow the USSS to remain in the DHS, continue its 
protective operations as normal, while conducting its financial crimes investigations 
under the guise of the DHS mandate to protect the nation’s infrastructure, which includes 
the banking and finance sector. A second option would be to transfer the USSS back to 
the Department of Treasury, where its financial crimes investigations dovetail with the 
Treasury’s mandate to ensure the nation’s financial systems. The report acknowledges 
that this move would require an evaluation of the USSS protective mission to determine 
if it would be effective while in the Treasury. The report argues that the Secret Service 
was a Treasury entity with both investigative and protective missions prior to its transfer 
to the DHS; however, the current increase in protective demands may justify maintaining 
the protective mission in the DHS. A third option would be for the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) to assume the investigative mission of the Secret Service. The report 
notes that the FBI may not be able to replicate the USSS proficiency in investigations of 
this sort without the transfer of some personnel and resources of the USSS to the FBI. A 
fourth suggested option would be to make the Secret Service an independent agency, 
coordinating financial crimes investigations with the Treasury and protection 
responsibilities with the DHS. While the report does briefly mention some ramifications 
and difficulties posed by some options, the report does not offer suggestions as to which 
option the author believes to be the best solution (Reese, 2010). 
The Congressional and government reports also document the challenges the 
USSS faces, but nowhere in these papers is a clear plan or even suggestion of the best 
plan or strategy for the USSS to pursue. 
C. SCHOLARLY PUBLICATIONS 
The author has not been able to locate any scholarly publications on the history or 
missions of the USSS, but has located and reviewed several papers written on other 
federal law enforcement agencies and their individual struggles to adapt and transform. 
Eric B. Smith, in his Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis, The 
Transformation of the FBI to Meet the Domestic Intelligence Needs of the United States, 
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outlines the ongoing efforts of the FBI to transform itself from a predominantly criminal 
investigative agency to a predominantly intelligence agency while preserving the criminal 
investigative capabilities and functions. He argues that the FBI should continue in both 
roles as the dual missions of criminal investigation and counterterrorism are intertwined 
in a manner that requires all available tools to combat the issues (Smith, 2009). 
Philip Wrona, in his NPS thesis, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 
Dysfunctional Not by Design, examines the results of the merger between the U.S. 
Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). He argues for 
further transformation of the blended agency to push ICE towards its goals of being 
“efficient and focused agency” (Wrona, 2007). ICE is the second largest federal law 
enforcement agency after the FBI, and the largest within the DHS. ICE’s creation, by the 
melding of portions of the U.S. Customs Service (Customs) and INS, has not been 
without turmoil and controversy. 
David Wolfe writes of the same problem from a different point of view in his 
NPS thesis, Transforming the U.S. Immigration System after 9/11: The Impact of 
Organizational Change and Collaboration in the Context of Homeland Security. Wolfe 
describes the organizational changes in the creation of the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) from portions of the former INS. He argues for better 
collaboration between ICE and USCIS to further both agencies missions (Wolfe, 2008). 
While these papers argue for transformation within individual agencies, Gregory 
Mandoli takes a holistic approach to the transformation of federal law enforcement in his 
NPS thesis, The Sandbox Strategy: The Why and How of Federal Law Enforcement 
Integration (Mandoli, 2006). Mandoli argues for the consolidation of all or portions of 
the six major federal law enforcement agencies, namely the FBI, ICE, Drug Enforcement 
Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Internal 
Revenue Service-Criminal Investigative Division and the United States (U.S.) Secret 
Service-Office of Investigations. Mandoli claims the redundancy of investigative efforts 




criminal investigation and that the nation would be better served with all of the 
investigative resources housed within one department and agency, the Department of 
Justice and the FBI. 
Mandoli makes this argument even as the FBI struggles to redefine itself as a 
counter terror and criminal investigations agency. The FBI has wide ranging jurisdiction 
from bank robbery to kidnapping to auto theft; however, the national security priorities of 
the FBI are terrorism, counterintelligence and cybercrime. The FBI’s demanding primary 
mission of counterterrorism has continued to require an ever increasing amount of the 
limited resources of the agency. 
All of the federal law enforcement agencies mentioned are re-examining their 
roles and missions. The Secret Service is also in a period of transformation as it defines 
missions and roles in the new department. These theses do not directly address the issues 
faced by the USSS, but they do document the challenges faced by other agencies and 
suggest some possible avenues for the USSS to pursue.  
D. ORGANIZATIONAL AND GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT  
As a federal agency with the requisite bureaucracy and mandates, the USSS has 
many of the same management challenges and issues as do other government agencies. 
The author reviewed several organizational and management documents and papers that 
illustrate some of the issues common to government agencies and management that are of 
value to this discussion. 
In 2003, The General Accounting Office (GAO) produced a report, “Results-
Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational 
Transformations,” designed to “help federal agencies implement successful 
transformations of their cultures, as well as the new Department of Homeland Security 
merge its various originating components into a unified department.” In this report, the 
GAO identified nine key practices and implementation steps agencies could use to 
become “more results oriented, customer focused and collaborative in nature” (United 
States General Accounting Office, 2003, p. 3). This GAO report is based on the  
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assumption that the agency in question recognizes the need for transformation. The 
Secret Service has struggled to maintain its unique identity and structure as the DHS has 
become more involved in the day-to-day workings of its subordinate agencies. 
In her book, Spying Blind, Amy B. Zegart argues that this transformational 
awareness is extremely difficult to discern. She relates the consequences of the FBI’s and 
the CIA’s failure to adapt their agencies to the new threats of global terrorism. Zegart is 
sympathetic to the problems faced by these two agencies and goes to great lengths to 
explain why it was so difficult for them to adapt to the evolving threat. She argues three 
main components were at play in these adaptive failures: The nature of organizations, 
rational self-interest, and the fragmented federal government. Zegart states, “these three 
enduring realities….provide a basic model for understanding why U.S. Intelligence 
agencies failed to adapt to the terrorist threat before September 11, why they have not 
done much better since then and why they are unlikely to improve substantially in the 
future” (Zegart, 2007). 
In the RAND Report, “Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the 
Options,” authored by Gregory F. Treverton, a method of assessment is offered to 
consider the costs and benefits of organizational change. This method is applicable to any 
effort to change or reorganize a government agency. Treverton suggests that the potential 
value of reorganization depends on many factors, assumptions and the determined scope 
of the reorganization. He applied a framework called “break even analysis” to provide a 
method of considering pro and cons of agency reorganization and how different 
assumptions may affect the balance of those pros and cons (Treverton, 2008). 
The 2010 U.S. Army Posture Statement includes an addendum on ARFORGEN. 
This relatively new concept is described as “… the structured progression of increased 
unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready 
and cohesive….units prepared for operational deployment…” “This rotational model, 
which maximizes total force utilization, replaces the Army’s Cold War–era, linear, tiered 
readiness strategic construct for force generation” (U.S. Army, 2010). The ARFORGEN 
model is similar to the USSS practice of hiring new agents into investigations, preparing 
them for protective assignments, transferring trained agents into permenant protective 
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assignments for a few years and then rotateing the experienced protection agents back to 
investigations to prepare new agents for the process. The author intends to explore this 
similarity in this thesis. 
The last body of literature suggests that government agencies rarely willingly 
undergo transformation or reorganization, and that reorganizations are notoriously 
difficult to complete successfully; however, some of the methods described if properly 
and thoughtfully applied, with agency and departmental support, could transform the 
USSS into a viable productive and useful agency for the next century. 
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III. OVERVIEW OF THE SECRET SERVICE 
The USSS has two primary missions, investigations and protection. The Secret 
Service claims these two missions are complementary. While this thesis addresses this 
claim in later chapters, a discussion of the responsibilities and capabilities of the Secret 
Service is in order. This chapter is intended to provide an overview of the Secret 
Service’s organization and missions 
The USSS was established in 1865 as a division of the Department of Treasury 
for combating the counterfeiting of U.S. currency and is currently a subordinate of the 
DHS. The USSS derives its authority primarily from Title 18 of the United States Code 
under statute 3056.  
Beginning with 12 operatives, the Secret Service has grown over the past 146 
years to almost 7,000 employees dispersed across three main categories: Special Agents 
(SA), Uniformed Division Officers, (UD) and Administrative, Professional and Technical 
employees (APT); and among three main assignments: Investigative Field Offices located 
throughout the world, Protection Divisions in Washington, DC. and at the residences of 
former Presidents, and Secret Service Headquarters in Washington, DC. Headquarters 
assignments in all three employee categories can be a support function, such as recruiting 
and training, or either investigations or protection.  
The 1,387 UD officers exclusively support the protective mission, and with few 
exceptions, are assigned within the Washington, DC area. The APT cadre, of 1,874 
employees, is concentrated at the Secret Service Headquarters, with one third of this 
group in field offices. APT employees provide support to both the investigative and 
protective missions. 
The remaining 3,542 employees are special agents who support both the 
protective and the investigative missions, with 795 in protection assignments, 457 at 
Secret Service Headquarters and 2,280 in field offices. The Secret Service operates 143 
domestic offices and 23 international field offices (U.S. Secret Service Work Force 
Planning Division, 2011). 
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A. INVESTIGATIONS 
The Secret Service shares jurisdiction in the investigation of other financial and 
computer crimes, with several other federal agencies, such as the FBI, ICE, and the U.S. 
Postal Inspection Service. As some of these federal law enforcement agencies have 
reallocated assets to more pressing issues, such as counterterrorism and immigration 
enforcement, the Secret Service has expanded its role and importance in the investigation 
of all types of financial and computer crimes.  
The Secret Service actively investigates the following types of crimes: 
• Threats against the President and other protected persons (Protective 
Intelligence) 
• Counterfeiting of currency (Foreign and domestic) 
• Counterfeiting of U.S. Commercial Securities 
• False Identification 
• U.S. Treasury Check Forgery 
• U.S. Bond Forgery 
• Electronic Financial Transaction Fraud (commercial and consumer) 
• Access Device Fraud (credit and debit card fraud) 
• Computer Fraud (scams, intrusion and hacking)  
• Embezzlement and misappropriation (public and private) 
• Food Stamp Fraud 
• Telecommunication Fraud  
• Child Pornography 
1. Protective Intelligence Investigations 
The most important and most challenging of investigations conducted by the 
Secret Service are those of a protective intelligence (PI) matter, or threats and or unusual 
direction of interest in a protectee. A protected person, or protectee, is any person 
provided physical protection by the Secret Service, as authorized by law or executive 
order. The Secret Service considers PI cases to be the most important type of 
investigation and has dedicated a great deal of resources, research and personnel to 
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address these issues. The Secret Service has a protective intelligence and assessment 
division and maintains a 24-hour Protective Intelligence Operations Center (PIOC) to 
monitor and refer all reported threats and directions of interest. The report of a threat 
requires an immediate response from one of the 166 Secret Service offices around the 
world.  
In PI cases, agents are required to conduct an investigation, not only into the 
prosecutive merits of a threat, but also the potential dangerousness of a subject. PI cases 
are a melding of the investigative mission and the protective mission. In his book, On 
Being Mad or Merely Angry, a study of John W. Hinckley, Jr. and other dangerous 
people, James W. Clarke states:  
There are tough decisions to make. The Presidents life depends on them 
being made correctly-not to mention that there are constitutional and legal 
implications of improper arrests—and the decisions are still based largely 
on the intuition of Secret Service Agents; it is a ‘very difficult and 
subjective problem for case agents.’ (Clarke, 1990) 
The case agent is required to make a threat assessment and a determination of the 
potential dangerousness of subjects based on his investigation of the subject and 
experience. 
The origins of PI investigations and threat assessment, and the precursor to the 
PIOC, stem from the creation of the Protective Research Section (PRS) created in 1940 in 
response to the dramatic increase in mailed threats to President Roosevelt. The purpose of 
the new section was “to analyze and make available to those charged with protecting the 
President, information from the White House mail and other sources concerning people 
potentially capable of violence to the President” (Commission, 1964). After the 
assassination of President Kennedy, and at the recommendation of the Warren 
Commission, the Secret Service reorganized the PRS and included a panel of psychiatric 
experts along with other measures to fulfill the predictive protective mission better. 
Since 1964, the Secret Service has conducted many studies in an effort to 
understand and predict targeted violence better. Most of these efforts have concentrated 
on the threat assessment of individuals that may pose a danger, as opposed to violent 
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groups. In 1992, the Secret Service undertook a study in an effort to examine the thinking 
and behavior of attackers or near attackers of prominent public figures. The goal of the 
study was to aid those with a protective responsibility to identify, assess, and manage 
persons who may pose a risk of violence toward this nation’s leaders. The Exceptional 
Case Study Project (ECSP), published for internal use in 1997, has gone through several 
editions. The USSS has based its entire threat assessment and threat management process 
on the findings of the ECSP. Persons that come to the attention of the USSS as having an 
unusual direction of interest in a protected person are evaluated as to their dangerousness 
based on the investigative methods implemented because of this study. The purpose of 
the ECSP was not to determine the psychological profile of an assassin but to concentrate 
on identifying the thinking and behavior of a potential assassin. This information would 
be operationally relevant to those charged with threat assessment and physical protection.  
The ECSP studied in great detail the characteristics, personal histories, and attack 
related behaviors of 83 persons that attacked, or approached with lethal intent, prominent 
American targets. This study determined that potential attackers could possibly be 
identified by their thinking and behaviors and, if they could be identified, they could be 
deterred from attacking. Surprisingly, the ECSP found that mental illness was not a 
critical factor. While most of the individuals studied were not “models of emotional 
wellbeing,” mental illness did not play a major role in the attack related behaviors 
exhibited by the subjects (Vossekuil & Fein, 2000). Since the implementation of the 
findings of the ECSP, the Secret Service has identified and intervened in thousands of 
instances of cases involving threats and unusual interests.  
2. Criminal Investigations 
The Secret Service continues to have sole federal jurisdiction into the 
investigation of counterfeit U.S. currency. The Secret Service aggressively investigates 
all types of financial and computer crimes with an emphasis on organized national and 




network of electronic crimes task forces (ECTF) based on the New York model 
established in 1995 (United States Secret Service, 2010b). According to the Secret 
Service,  
The concept of the ECTF network is to bring together not only federal, 
state and local law enforcement, but also prosecutors, private industry and 
academia. The common purpose is the prevention, detection, mitigation 
and aggressive investigation of attacks on the nation's financial and critical 
infrastructures. (United States Secret Service, 2010b) 
The Secret Service's ECTF initiatives prioritize investigative cases that involve 
electronic crimes. These initiatives provide necessary support and resources to field 
investigations that meet any one of the following criteria. 
• Significant economic or community impact  
• Participation of organized criminal groups involving multiple districts or 
transnational organizations  
• Use of schemes involving new technology (United States Secret Service, 
2010b) 
The USSS has established 27 of these ECTFs in the United States and two international 
ECTFS in Rome and in London.  
In the United States Secret Service Strategic Plan FY2008–FY2013, the Secret 
Service describes its mission as “to safeguard the nation’s financial infrastructure and 
payment systems to preserve the integrity of the economy, and to protect national leaders, 
visiting heads of state and government, designated sites and National Special Security 
Events” (U.S. Secret Service, 2008). 
According to Director Mark Sullivan’s recent testimony before Congress, in 
FY2010, the USSS efforts in combating financial crimes prevented an estimated 13.5 
billion dollars in losses, of which 6.95 billion involved cyber crimes, which is “a 
reflection of the Secret Service’s ability to adapt to emerging financial and cyber crime 
threats.” All USSS agents are trained in financial crimes and 1,400 agents are specially 
trained in electronic crimes investigations and computer forensics. The ECFT program, 
with 29 task forces in place, boasts of 4,000 private sector partners and, almost 2,500 
international and domestic law enforcement partners (United States Secret Service, 
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2011a). In another example of melding of the two missions, agents trained in computer 
forensics and electronic crime often directly support the protective mission with 
electronic critical infrastructure protection at protected sites and events. 
Success of the investigative program is not solely based on arrests and other 
statistics, but these figures do provide an indication of how effective the Secret Service is 
in executing its mission. The USSS effected 8,930 arrests with a 94% conviction rate in 
FY2010. The USSS claims to have prevented over 13.5 billion dollars in potential 
financial crimes losses, 6.5 billion dollars of which is attributed to cybercrime. The ratio 
of counterfeit currency to genuine currency in circulation reported to be less than one 
one-hundreth of one percent (United States Secret Service, 2011b). By contrast, at the 
end of the Civil War in 1865, an estimated one third of all currency in circulation was 
counterfeit (Kessler, 2009).  
In 2006, Expectmore.gov conducted a detailed assessment of USSS financial and 
infrastructure investigations. Expectmore.gov was developed by the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget to assess the performance of every federal program. At the time 
of this evaluation, Expectmore.gov had rated 1,015 federal programs. The USSS was one 
of 193 programs to receive an assessment of effective, the highest possible rating (Office 
of Management and Budget, 2006). 
3. Personnel Security Background Investigations 
All Secret Service employees are required to hold a top secret national security 
clearance. To meet this requirement, the Secret Service conducts full field personnel 
security background investigations on all prospective employees, as well as regular 
background updates for current employees. A security background investigation is an 
exhaustive inquiry into the habits and life history of the applicant or employee. Twenty-
one specific factors are checked. Everything from foreign travel and contacts, school 
records, tax records, credit history, marital status, to police and criminal records are 
reviewed. Neighbors, in every place the subject has resided, college professors, at every 
school attended, and coworkers, at every place of employment, are interviewed in an 
effort to elicit any hidden flaw or misrepresentation.  
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Special agents assigned to investigative field offices conduct all of these 
investigations, protective intelligence, financial crimes and personnel security 
background.  
B. PROTECTION 
The protective mission of the USSS came about as a “coincidence of history” 
(Petro & Robinson, 2005). After the assassination of President Garfield in 1881, the 
USSS assumed part time protection of the President. At least two USSS operatives were 
present when President McKinley was assassinated in 1901. It was after this attack that 
Congress formally authorized the USSS protection of the President. The USSS initially 
provided simple bodyguard accompaniment to the President, but since then it has 
developed into a complicated protective methodology providing a protective cocoon from 
all hazards.  
While best known for presidential protection, the USSS currently provides 
protection to 37 persons, including the President’s family, the Vice President and family, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of the Treasury, former presidents and 
their wives. The USSS also provides protection for all heads of state, and their spouses 
visiting the United States. Finally, the USSS is mandated to plan and implement security 
for any designated NSSE, for instance, presidential inaugurals, G-8 summits, Olympic 
Games (on U.S. soil), and national political conventions. The Secret Service also protects 
foreign missions in Washington, DC. 
Protection for permanent protectees, the President, Vice President and former 
presidents are provided by details of special agents assigned to them. Temporary 
protectee details, such as visiting foreign heads of state or presidential candidates, are 
staffed with special agents on temporary assignment from investigative field offices and 
the dignitary protective division. 
The Secret Service does not publicly discuss the specific types and methods of its 
security operations. According to the Secret Service website, the protection provided to a 
protectee is extensive and much more than a bodyguard function. Fastidious planning for 
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a protective event and comprehensive threat assessments contribute to the Secret 
Service’s efforts to “prevent an incident before it occurs” (U.S. Secret Service, 2011a). 
Prior to a protectee stop or visit, advance teams survey sites, determine resources, 
plan routes and notify local authorities. The lead advance agent plans security with all 
law enforcement participating in the visit. All available intelligence and pertinent 
information is discussed, evaluated and disseminated. Sites are secured and swept for 
explosives, weapons and other threats prior to the arrival of a protectee. Advance work is 
meticulous and thorough in an effort to identify and mitigate all potential risks. 
In FY2010, the USSS provided protection for 3,926 stops or visits of domestic 
protectees and 2,492 stops or visits of foreign dignitaries. Two national special security 
events, the State of the Union address and the nuclear security summit, were planned and 
implemented. The Secret Service provided credentialing and other security for Super 
Bowl XLIV.  
The protective mission has expanded with the increased threat of international 
terrorism and the advent of new technologies that enhance existing risks or create new 
vulnerabilities. Protective perimeters have increased due to advances in improvised 
explosive devices. The USSS has implemented enhanced detection techniques for 
chemical, biological and radioactive elements and uses the latest methodologies in threat 
assessment and mitigation (U.S. Secret Service, 2011a). 
C. ANALYSIS 
The protective function of the Secret Service is well established and unlikely to be 
usurped by another agency. Some have argued, however; that the Secret Service should 
have divested its investigative function as it transferred from the Department of Treasury 
to the DHS and have claimed that the dual mission “ does not make sense nor does it 
afford maximally effective protection” (Melanson & Stevens, 2002, p. 338). 
The Congressional Research Service report, “The U.S. Secret Service: An 
Examination and Analysis of its Evolving Missions,” discusses the placement of the 
Secret Service in the DHS and the question of whether the investigative function should 
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remain in the DHS. The report further questions the dual missions of the Secret Service 
and calls for Congressional debate on the question of the Secret Service’s primary 
mission “in order to determine where the service can most efficiently execute its mission 
and be appropriately supported.” The report makes no conclusions on these questions 
(Reese, 2010, p. 16). 
If Congress were to contemplate a separation of missions of the Secret Service, 
some key problems must be addressed: Where should the investigative mission of the 
service best fit in the various departments of the government? How would the Secret 
Service effectively provide for unusual or increased protective responsibilities? 
The cyber threat confronting the United States is rapidly increasing as the 
number of actors with the tools and abilities to use computers against the 
United States or its interests is rising. The country’s vulnerability is 
escalating as the U.S. economy and critical infrastructures become 
increasingly reliant on interdependent computer networks and the World 
Wide Web. Large scale computer attacks on our critical infrastructure and 
economy would have potentially devastating results. (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Cyber Crime, n.d.) 
Several U.S. federal agencies investigate transnational electronic and financial 
crimes while competing with each other for limited resources and investigations. The 
FBI, the USSS and U.S. ICE, all investigate various types and forms of these crimes 
domestically and internationally. Each has its own computer crimes section, forensic 
computer labs and analysts. Each has attempted to develop its own inter disciplinary 
network of partnerships with state, local, private, academic and international partners. 
Each agency is somewhat effective; however, the overlapping of jurisdictions and 
investigative functions has led to a duplication of investigative efforts, redundant 
capabilities and confusion among domestic and international agencies as where to turn 
for assistance in this field. 
The U.S. GAO issued a report in June of 2007 entitled “Cybercrime, Public and 
Private Entities face challenges in addressing cyber threats.” This report catalogs the 
dangers of cyber crime and the U.S. Government’s efforts to combat it including the 
overlapping jurisdictions and the redundant programs within the Department of Justice 
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and the DHS. Surprisingly, the report does not recommend any changes in jurisdiction or 
programs except for the suggestion that both the FBI and the USSS make internal policy 
changes to special agent career track to take advantage more fully of those agents 
specially trained in cyber investigations (United States Government Accountability 
Office, 2007). 
In his NPS thesis, The Sandbox Strategy: The Why and How of Federal Law 
Enforcement Integration, Gregory Mandoli argues for the consolidation of the six major 
U.S. federal law enforcement agencies into the FBI. He states, “the current configuration 
of major law enforcement agencies within three different executive departments, Justice, 
Treasury and Homeland Security produces inter agency conflict, redundancy, data 
fragmentation, jurisdictional foreclosure, and increases civil rights violations.” He claims 
this diminishes the effectiveness of federal law enforcement both collectively and per 
agency (Mandoli, 2006). 
Several possible solutions can solve this problem. The creation of a new federal 
financial crimes enforcement agency within the Department of Treasury is appealing, for 
example, a Treasury Enforcement Agency, TEA. However, the current political and 
budget climate make the creation of a new agency unlikely. An argument could be made 
for an expanded law enforcement role for Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN); however, FinCEN does not currently have law enforcement authority 
and functions only as a criminal intelligence service to other law enforcement agencies.  
The FBI could assume all responsibility for transnational financial and cyber 
crime. The FBI has wide ranging jurisdiction from bank robbery to kidnapping to auto 
theft; however, the national security priorities of the FBI are terrorism, 
counterintelligence and cybercrime. The FBI’s demanding primary mission of counter 
terrorism has continued to require an ever increasing amount of the limited resources of 
the agency. The FBI’s main focuses in cyber crime investigation tends towards counter 
terror, counter espionage and exploited children. Within the cybercrime priority, Internet 
fraud and identity theft are listed as the lowest priority (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
FBI Strategic Plan, n.d.). According to the FBI website, the agency’s fourth mission is its 
traditional criminal priorities. Under these priorities, white collar crime is listed as 
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seventh out of eight (Federal Bureau of Investigations, “FBI About Us,” n.d.). Clearly, 
the FBI does not regard financial and cyber crimes as important jurisdictions. If the FBI 
were to receive exclusive jurisdiction in the investigation of transnational financial and 
computer crimes, would it be able or inclined to devote the resources to deliver the 
attention and efforts commensurate with the threat posed to the nation’s financial 
infrastructure?  
ICE is charged with protecting national security by enforcing the nation’s 
immigration and customs laws. ICE claims that combating criminal activity conducted on 
or facilitated by the Internet is a leading priority, and as such, ICE has developed its own 
cyber crime program called the Cyber Crimes Center (C3) (Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, n.d.). 
According to the ICE strategic plan FY2010–2014, the main priorities for ICE are 
1) preventing terrorism and enhancing security, 2) securing and managing U.S. borders, 
and 3) enforcing and administering U.S. immigration laws. Much like the FBI, ICE has a 
whole host of diverse and competing missions within its core mandates. ICE continues to 
focus its main efforts on border and immigration issues. ICE would face the same issues 
as the FBI in being able to devote the recourses and attention to the emerging financial 
and cyber threats. 
ICE is the second largest federal law enforcement agency after the FBI, and the 
largest within DHS. ICE’s creation, by the melding of portions of the U.S. Customs 
Service (Customs) and the INS, has not been without turmoil and controversy. The 
agency’s struggles to merge into a cohesive, efficient and singular agency are well 
documented in Philip Wrona’s NPS thesis, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 
Dysfunctional Not by Design. 
Wrona writes, “ICE is not a successful merger of INS and Customs. ICE is an 
inefficient agency without its own culture. The organization is stagnated in a convolution 




internal challenges ICE faces indicates the further expansion of its mission into the 
primary investigative transnational computer and financial crimes investigations would 
not be productive or successful.  
The Secret Service has been scrutinized because its dual missions can cause 
problems in effective prosecutions. The need for agents to be available for protective 
assignments has led to some criticism, and in some ways, bolsters arguments for the 
Secret Service to divest itself of the investigative mission in favor of other federal 
agencies. Field agents are not always available for grand jury or court appearances, and 
some investigations are slowed because of temporary protective assignments (Kessler, 
2009). 
While these arguments do make a case that other federal agencies could conduct 
the same types of investigation, concerns exist that other agencies may not be as 
successful as the Secret Service in this regard, and more importantly, does not address the 
Secret Service’s need for the benefits the investigative mission provides to the protective 
mission. These benefits; of experiential learning, respite from the rigors of protection, 
and a surge capacity of well-trained agents, are explored in later chapters. 
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IV. A COMPARISON OF THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE AND THE 
U.S. ARMY PERSONNEL ROTATION POLICIES 
As noted in Chapter I of this thesis, the Secret Service argues that the Secret 
Service’s investigative mission is crucial for the effectiveness of its protective 
responsibilities. To an outside observer, this concept might not seem obvious: why should 
one agency, which is most well known for its mission of protection of the nation’s 
leaders, also have the mission of investigating financial crimes? One of the primary 
reasons why the two missions are complementary is that the Secret Service has found that 
agents are most successful if they are rotated during their careers between the two 
missions. 
This chapter first describes the Secret Service policy of personnel rotation, and 
explains its reasoning for this policy. Next, it demonstrates how this policy, and by 
extension, the importance of combining both missions within the service by comparing it 
with a similar policy employed by the U.S. Army.  
A. U.S. SECRET SERVICE CAREER TRACK 
The USSS does not have a formal force generation policy, but it does face issues 
of training, readiness and deployment. The Secret Service has developed a career track 
for special agents to address these resource demands. “As an international agency with 
diverse responsibility, the Secret Service recommends and in some career tracks requires 
that special agents accept multiple reassignments during the course of their career” 
(U.S.Secret Service, 2008, p. 1). 
All new USSS special agents begin their careers with an intense period of 
training. They complete 12 weeks of basic criminal investigations training at the Federal 
Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glenco, Georgia and another 18 weeks of 
USSS special agent training at the USSS James J. Rowley Training Center (JJRTC) in 
Beltsville, Maryland (U.S. Secret Service, 2010). Upon completion of formal training, the 
new agents are sworn in and assigned to an investigative field office for on the job 
training through experiential learning. These agents learn the nuances of investigation 
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and protection from their peers and first line supervisors. As they progress in experience 
and institutional maturity, they are given increasingly responsible assignments of greater 
complexity and consequence.  
After a period of several years of apprentice, these agents are promoted to the 
journeyman rate and considered prepared for a permanent protection assignment. During 
this period, special agents are conducting investigations, protective intelligence and 
criminal, participating in protective advances for lower level protectees, and providing 
surge capacity to the larger protective details (presidential protective division, vice 
presidential protective division and major foreign heads of state) and events (United 
Nations General Assembly, national special security events and presidential campaigns). 
These agents are subject to regular domestic and worldwide travel in support of both the 
investigative and protective missions. Journeyman special agents are transferred into a 
protection assignment based on longevity, aptitude and personal preference. 
Permanent protection entails a verity of assignments, including the larger details, 
such as presidential protective division and vice presidential protective division, the 
smaller details, former presidents and their wives, Protective Intelligence and Analysis 
Division (PIAD), Technical Security Division (TSD) and Special Operations Division 
(SOD). The typical permanent protection assignment is for three to five years. Agents in 
a protective assignment provide physical protection, conduct protective advances and 
travel extensively domestically and worldwide in support of the protective mission (U.S. 
Secret Service, 2011). “ Limiting protective duty to a three to five year span helps reduce 
stress and prevent agent burnout” according to Philip H. Melanson’s book, The Secret 
Service: The Hidden History of an Enigmatic Agency (Melanson & Stevens, 2002, p. 
181). Another unidentified agent told Melanson, “I liked the divided responsibility 
because it was mentally challenging… There was more of a mental challenge in 
following the trail of counterfeiters. I enjoyed it more than Presidential protection” 
(Melanson & Stevens, 2002, pp. 181–182). Former Assistant Director for Protective 
Operations, Nick Trotta, described the demands of protection assignments in this way, 
“We have a responsibility to the American Public, and it comes sometimes with a price: 
long hours, travel, missing birthday parties, and transfers” (Kessler, 2009, p. 223). 
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Upon completion of the permanent protection assignment, special agents typically 
return to an investigative assignment or another support role (i.e., administration, 
training, inspection), at which they continue with investigative duties and provide surge 
capacity for periods of high protective demands.  
As an example of the career track, special agent Tim McCarthy, who was 
wounded during the attack on President Reagan in 1981, began his career as a special 
agent in the Chicago Field Office. After several years in an investigative assignment in 
Chicago, he was assigned to the President’s detail.  
As a side note and contrary to urban myth, during the attempt on President 
Reagan, Agent McCarthy did not actually jump in front of a bullet to protect the 
president, but he certainly acted in a manner against expectations and normal human 
reaction. As Hinkley fired his pistol at President Reagan, McCarthy was holding open the 
right rear door of the limo. Hearing the shots, Press Secretary Brady, Metropolitan police 
officer Delahanty instinctivly ducked and were wounded in the head and neck. McCarthy 
turned toward the sounds and stood upright, his body between the President and potential 
assassin, and was wounded in the chest. Had McCarthy reacted differently, that bullet 
would have almost certainly caused another grevious wound to the President (Petro & 
Robinson, 2005). 
Upon his recovery, McCarthy recived a much deserved transfer to his office of 
choice, Chicago. A short while later, he was promoted and returned to the President’s 
detail at the request of a grateful Mrs. Reagan. After completion of this second tour on 
the detail, he returned to Chicago until he retired in 1993 as the special agent in charge of 
the Chicago field office. McCarthy’s career was unusual in that he completed two tours 
on the President’s detail. He told author Melanson that his protection stint lasted “ too 
long” (Melanson & Stevens, 2002, p. 181). 
Special Agent Joe Petro was initally assigned to the Philadelphia field office but 
spent almost half his career in a number of protection assignments including the 
President’s detail, Vice President’s detail, dignitary protection division and intelligence 
division. He also served in several field offices including Special Agent in Charge of the 
 32 
Washington field office. He readily describes himself as a protection guy, but then he 
states, “ I would have gladly gone back to investigations.” Petro adds, “Working in the 
Washington Field Office meant I could enjoy the freedom that came from no longer 
having to travel so exhaustively” (Petro & Robinson, 2005, pp. 270, 265). 
Figure 1 illustrates the career track from training through protection assignment 
and return to investigations. The career track does not return to a reset or training phase 
as the ARFORGEN model. While a short period of retraining as agents transfer from 
protection back to investigations occurs, agents are immediately available for 
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Figure 1.   U.S. Secret Service Career Track 
In his 2011 testimony before the Committiee on Appropriations, Subcommittee 
on Homeland Security, the Director of the Secret Service, Mark Sullivan stated: 
The partnerships that the Secret Service relies on to successfully perform 
our protection responsibilities are cultivated at the field office level. In 
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addition to the permanent protective details dedicated solely to the 
protection of our nation’s leaders, the backbone of the Secret Service is 
our network of 142 domestic and 23 international investigative field 
offices. These offices carry out protective intelligence and financial crimes 
investigations while providing the surge capacity needed to successfully 
carry out the Secret Service’s protection responsibilities. 
All Secret Service special agents begin their career as a criminal 
investigator in a field office. The training, maturity and judgment they 
develop as criminal investigators in their field office assignments are 
essential for a successful transition into the next phase of their careers – 
protecting our nation's leaders. During their time in the field, special 
agents are routinely assigned to temporary protective assignments. This 
developmental period enhances their skills in both the protective and 
investigative disciplines and promotes the philosophy of having a pool of 
well-trained and experienced agents capable of handling the Secret 
Service’s dual mission. Through conducting criminal investigations, 
special agents develop relationships with local, state and federal law 
enforcement partners that prove critical when the President, Vice 
President, or other protectees visit their district. These relationships also 
enhance investigations into protective intelligence investigations against 
Secret Service protectees. (United States Secret Service, 2011a) 
B. U.S. ARMY ARFORGEN 
For much of the last decade, and for the near future, the U.S.’s armed forces, and 
in particular the U.S. Army, have been and will be involved in persistent conflict. This 
long-term level of conflict required the Army to rethink its Cold War methods of troop 
training, readiness and deployment. “The impetus for this change was primarily driven by 
the complex nature of today's threat, the reality of preparing forces on compressed time 
lines for extended deployments and the imperative to preserve the all volunteer force” 
(Campbell, 2009). 
In 2006, the U.S. Army implemented a “transformational force generation model” 
(U.S. Army, 2010) called Army Force Generation or ARFORGEN. ARFORGEN is 
designed to provide a continuous supply of deployment ready troops, which is 
accomplished through the use of a troop rotation method called ARFORGEN force pools. 
Force pools include reset, train/ready and available. ARFORGEN calls for a set ratio of 
time deployed to time at home of one deployment rotation to two at home, or non-
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deployed rotations. This deployment schedule allows for strategic surge capacity in the 
event of short-term increased demands and increases organizational and operational 
depth.  
The reset pool is for soldiers returning from deployment. These troops reintegrate 
with families, receive and implement new equipment, and individual education and 
training. The train/ready pool is for soldiers undergoing unit and mission training. This 
period is used for unit cohesiveness, tactics training, unit exercises and other forms of 
experiential learning. The available pool is for equipped and trained units deployable as 
needed throughout the U.S. Army Command. This period is used to maintain deployment 
readiness and actual deployment.  
Figure 2 illustrates the ARFORGEN process from reset phase through 
deployment and return to reset. Lt.Col. V. J. Tedesco explained the need for 
ARFORGEN in this way, “we had more demand for forces than we had forces available. 
You can sprint and sprint and sprint, but you can’t do it for 26 miles… and we are in a 
marathon” (Hemmerly-Brown, 2009). 
 
Figure 2.   ARFORGEN Force Pools (From: U.S. Army, 2010) 
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“This new process allows the Army to increase its force generation capability by 
simultaneously providing and supporting forces and by meeting its strategic 
commitments and the nation’s global military requirements” (Kenyon, 2006). 
The ARFORGEN process appears to achieve its stated goals of meeting the 
demands for trained and ready forces at a rate that Army leadership considers sustainable, 
the ability to add forces to meet a spike in demand and undertake exceptional measures to 
meet an extreme circumstance. The ARFORGEN model and process is flexible, agile, 
collaborative and continuous (Campbell, 2009). 
C. ANALYSIS 
The U.S. Army developed the ARFORGEN model to be able to provide a steady 
stream of trained troops ready for deployment. As soldiers complete deployment, they 
return to reset, retrain, and prepare to redeploy. This model has had some success in 
meeting the demands for combat ready troops while providing a regular schedule of 
rotation, thus allowing for respite, refit and training for soldiers transitioning from the 
rigors of combat deployment to the reset phase while providing a surge capacity in times 
of national emergency and high demand for resources. The deployment phase has been 
described as a sprint and the mission described as a marathon. The ARFORGEN policy 
allows the Army to turn the marathon into a relay race, where trained and ready troops 
relieve the exhausted units. The program allows individual soldiers and their families to 
anticipate and plan for deployments on a consistent schedule.  
The USSS career path also provides a steady stream of trained agents ready for 
protection assignments. Special agent protection assignments generally last longer than 
troop deployments–3 to 5 years as opposed to 1-year cycles-and agents are individually 
transferred unlike entire Army units. Much like the Army mission has become never 
ending, with a constant need for fresh, trained and ready troops, the Secret Service’s 
mission is perpetual and has the same need for fresh, trained and ready agents to deploy 
in a protection assignment as exhausted agents return to the field. The career track model 
is successful as is the ARFORGEN model in that it meets the needs for protection ready 
agents and provides a regular rotation allowing for respite from hyper vigilance and 
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pressures of permanent protective assignments, much like the deployment cycle of 
ARFORGEN. The career track model also provides a surge capacity for periods of high 
protective responsibility demands similar to the ready phase of ARFORGEN. The career 
track also allows agents and their families to anticipate and prepare for transfers on a 
consistent schedule.  
The physical protection of a person or place can be quite demanding. The 
tremendous amount of travel, long work days and constant state of hyper vigilance 
combine to fatigue the mind and body of an individual assigned to this type of work for 
extended periods of time. To counter this effect, the Secret Service currently rotates its 
agents off permanent protection after four to five years in an assignment. If the Secret 
Service was to divest itself of the investigative mission and become an agency with the 
sole mission of protection, the quality of its protection may diminish from a dearth of 
experienced agents and exhaustion of its resources. 
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V. EVIDENCE FROM A USSS COMPREHENSIVE JOB 
ANALYSIS 
This chapter is designed to determine whether the investigative mission of the 
Secret Service provides measurable value to the protective mission. In 2007, the USSS 
contracted with an independent firm, PDRI, to conduct a comprehensive job analysis for 
the special agent position. This chapter begins with a background of the PDRI study. The 
second section analyzes the study’s data and demonstrates the linkages between 
investigative competencies and protective tasks.  
A. THE PDRI STUDY 
The PDRI study called, United States Secret Service: Job Analysis for Special 
Agents in Grades GS-5 through GS-13, was completed and delivered in a report format in 
October of 2008 (Swartout, O'Leary, & Pulakos, 2008). This job analysis became the 
foundation for a performance-based promotional test. The information gathered lends 
itself to a number of other uses, such as selection, training, performance management and 
career development. This thesis uses the data gathered in this job analysis to illuminate 
the linkage between competencies learned and practiced by special agents in investigative 
assignments to tasks performed by special agents in protective assignments. An 
explanation of the development of the job analysis is provided to support the validity of 
the underlying research.  
This job analysis had three main goals. 
1. Identify the tasks performed by special agents across roles and 
assignments 
2. Identify the competencies and technical knowledge required for the 
performance of those tasks 
3. Provide job analytic information to be used for the foundation for the 
development of a number of human resource applications (Swartout, 
O'Leary, & Pulakos, 2008) 
This job analysis was conducted in a manner consistent with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission’s Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection 
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Procedures, The Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology’s Principles for 
the Validation and Use of Personnel Selection Procedures, and the American 
Psychological Association’s Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing.  
First, lists of tasks, competencies and technical knowledge areas were developed. 
The process included the collection and review of background information. This 
background information consisted of a literature review of relevant available documents, 
such as positions classification standards, position descriptions, vacancy announcements, 
job analysis conducted within other federal agencies for similar jobs, Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) competencies, training material, career track and promotion process 
information. 
Next, a series of job expert interviews with experienced special agents was 
conducted. The interviews were designed to give the analysts “a broad understanding of 
the unique elements of the special agent job” (Swartout, O'Leary, & Pulakos, 2008). 
Eight interviews were conducted following a structured protocol. This protocol guided 
the participants to identify tasks, competencies and technical knowledge required in the 
special agent position. 
Once the background information was collected and reviewed and the subject 
matter experts had been interviewed, this data was used to develop a draft list of tasks 
that comprehensively cover the work performed by special agents. The draft list 
underwent a series of sorting and refinements by both the subject matter experts and 
experienced analysts to categorize and label higher order tasks.  
Using the same data and in a similar manner, the subject matter experts and the 
analysts developed a comprehensive draft list of competencies and technical knowledge 
required for the performance of special agent tasks. The subject matter experts and the 
analysts subjected these competencies to the same series of sorting and refinements to 
categorize and label the competencies. 
To further validate and finalize the lists, a series of job expert workshops was held 
to review and revise the draft lists. Four workshops were held with a total of 38 special 
agents with experience in a variety of assignments and locations. The PDRI analysts 
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followed a structured protocol to guide the agents through reviews, comments and 
revisions of each list. The workshops resulted in a comprehensive list of 186 tasks 
arranged in 23 higher order task categories, 61 competencies arranged into 11 higher 
order competency categories and 21 technical knowledge areas.  
Up to this point, the lists of tasks, competencies and technical knowledge had 
only been reviewed and commented on by a subset of subject matter experts. A Job 
Analysis Questionnaire (JAQ) was developed to collect information from a larger sample 
of special agents. The JAQ consists of three sections: task, competencies and technical 
knowledge. The task section was designed to evaluate task importance, time spent and 
difficulty. The competencies and the technical knowledge sections were designed to 
evaluate importance and if the competency or technical knowledge is required at entry at 
a particular position or grade. The technical knowledge section also evaluated the level of 
recall required. 
A pilot test of the JAQ was administered, which revealed no major problems with 
the questionnaire. The JAQ was distributed to all special agents in grades GS-5 through 
GS-13. The questionnaire yielded 956 responses or a 34.19% overall rate. The responses 
were screened for quality and analyzed to assess data quality. The results were used to 
finalize the important tasks, competencies and technical knowledge areas. 
The final step of this job analysis was to determine links between tasks performed 
by special agents and the competencies and technical knowledge needed to perform those 
tasks. Each task, competency and technical knowledge area was evaluated based on the 
JAQ data as to its relevance and importance. The PDRI analysts again conducted 
workshops with a subset of experienced special agents from a wide variety of 
assignments. Each special agent independently rated individual important tasks with a 
determination (yes/no) about the necessity of each competency and technical knowledge 
area in the performance of that task. Task and competency or technical knowledge areas 
were considered linked if 60% or more of the workshop participants agreed that they 
were required to perform the task.  
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The technical knowledge areas provided one area, USSS policies, procedures, 
regulations and manuals common to both protection and investigative tasks. 
The job analysis report goes further to identify the competencies and technical 
knowledge areas that may be considered in testing in a promotion system. As this portion 
is not relevant to this thesis, it is not discussed further. The report also made distinctions 
between the tasks, competencies and technical knowledge required of special agents at 
the GS-5 through GS-13 levels. Typically, special agents are hired at the GS 5, 7, or 9 
levels, depending on experience and education. Special agents are promoted if they are 
performing at an acceptable level, annually, from a GS-5, to GS-7, 9, 11, 12, and, finally 
GS-13. As agents progress through the series of promotions, they are assigned tasks of 
increasing responsibility and complexity. A GS-13 special agent is considered to be the 
journeyman rate and is generally fully trained and capable of any assignment. Anything 
above the GS-13 level is considered supervisory and agents must compete for promotion. 
For the purposes of this thesis, only the sections of the job analysis report pertaining to 
the journeyman rate, the GS-13, are evaluated.  
B. ANALYSIS  
As this thesis is concerned with the relationship of the investigative mission to the 
protective mission, the data to formulate this analysis has been limited to only those tasks 
identified as purely investigative or protection.  
1. Investigative Tasks 
• A-1 Receive investigative referrals related to USSS core violations from 
other agencies, police departments, financial institutions, private citizens, 
etc. 
• A-2 Analyze available intelligence, evidence and other information to 
determine if a violation has occurred and whether a case should be 
initiated, put on hold, or terminated 
• A-3 Administratively open/close an investigative case 
• A-4 Identify the most effective and efficient investigative techniques and 
path for a given case and situation 
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• A-5 Plan operational activities to include strategic, tactical, and logistical 
considerations and contingency and worst case scenario plans 
• A-6 Obtain necessary approvals for investigative procedures (e.g., 
surveillance, use of informants) 
• A-7 Initiate case actions (e.g., serving subpoenas, obtaining warrants, 
preparing affidavits/Title III [wiretaps]) 
• A-8 Conduct background checks and investigations of subjects and 
applicants for employment  
• A-9 Secure and canvas crime scene to locate and preserve potential 
evidence and locate subjects and witnesses 
• A-10 Interview subjects and witnesses to elicit information and obtain 
statements /affidavits relevant to investigations 
• A-11 Identify, assess the suitability of, develop and use individuals as 
cooperating sources/informants 
• A-12 Perform undercover work to gather information or evidence, 
including building rapport and talking with suspects in an undercover 
capacity 
• A-13 engage in surveillance activities to collect evidence and plan 
investigative /enforcement activities 
• A-14 Evaluate the level of culpability of suspects throughout an 
investigation and determine a cases merit for prosecution 
• A-15 Determine appropriate violations with which to charge subjects 
(Swartout, O'Leary, & Pulakos, 2008, pp. Appendix G 2–4) 
2. Protective Tasks 
• B-1 Establish agreements with protectee(s)’ staff and or host committee 
• B-2 Plan and coordinate logistics (e.g., transportation, lodging, scheduling, 
team assignments, etc.) for protective advances and operations 
• B-3 Plan and conduct protective advances to identify security 
vulnerabilities and requirements for protective operations 
• B-4 Develop detailed security plans in consultation with federal, state, 
county and local law enforcement, fire, rescue, and public service 
personnel, military personnel, and foreign counterparts 
• B-5 Develop contingency, incident and crisis management plans 
• B-6 Perform safety and security sweeps to identify and locate suspicious 
individuals or potentially dangerous parcels 
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• B-7 Perform physical screening procedures on persons, packages, vehicles 
and other materials as necessary 
• B-8 Maintain assigned security post, controlling access into and around 
secure areas to ensure security is not breached. 
• B-9 Maintain proper coverage of protectee(s) using correct formations to 
provide immediate physical protection 
• B-10 Take necessary action to safeguard and or evacuate protectee(s) in 
the event of unexpected disruptions or breaches in security in accordance 
with USSS policies and procedures. 
• B-11 Maintain control of groups or crowds 
• B-12 Collect information required to evaluate protective intelligence 
subjects using a variety of methods (e.g., review of medical records, 
subject interviews, corroborative interviews) 
• B-13 Assess subjects to determine level of dangerousness in accordance 
with the exceptional case study and the behavioral approach to threat 
assessment 
• B-14 Drive vehicles during protective movements, executing protective 
driving maneuvers to ensure the safe and timely transport of protectee(s), 
their traveling party and their property 
• B-15 Maintain the integrity of the motorcade, coordinating the movement 
of the motorcade through appropriate route(s) and ensuring all vehicles are 
in alignment 
• B-16 Provide tactical support and cover for the protective detail 
• B-17 Conduct counter surveillance activities to identify individuals 
seeking to understand and exploit the methods and procedures used by the 
USSS 
• B-18 Monitor and relay communications during operations using 
appropriate frequencies and following the proper communication chain of 
command 
• B-19 Perform security room/command post functions to include 
coordinating the deployment of protective state and local assets (Swartout, 
O'Leary, & Pulakos, 2008, pp. Appendix G 4–8) 
These listed tasks are not the only tasks performed by special agents, but only 
those identified in the study as solely investigative or protective. By comparing these two 
lists, it becomes apparent that the most of the skills or competencies required to complete 
the investigative tasks would be the same as those required for the protective tasks. For 
instance, many of the skills required for the successful completion of investigative task 
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A-5: Plan operational activities to include strategic, tactical, and logistical considerations 
and contingency and worst case scenario plans—are similar to those required for 
protective task B-5: Develop contingency, incident and crisis management plans. 
The PDRI study also identified 59 competencies required for successful special 
agent performance at the journeyman or GS-13 rate. This analysis illustrates the 
similarities of the unrelated tasks and the linked competencies required for completion of 
these tasks.  
Table 1 demonstrates the number of investigative/protective tasks linked to an 
individual competency. The first column lists the 59 competencies. The second column 
shows for each competency how many of the 15 investigative tasks involve that 









written communication 11 12 
oral communication 14 18 
listening 13 18 
negotiating 10 13 
influencing and persuading 9 12 
collaboration 10 14 
partnering 9 16 
interpersonal skills 12 16 
leveraging diversity 7 14 
conflict management 4 15 
reasoning 13 18 
problem solving 12 18 
judgment and decision making 14 18 
creativity and innovation 2 18 
learning 11 18 
reading 15 13 
arithmetic 2 0 
memory 10 0 
perceptual speed and accuracy 2 15 
spatial relations 2 0 








mental visualization 1 0 
integrity 15 18 
flexibility /adaptability 11 18 
stress tolerance 5 18 
resilience 5 18 
assertiveness 11 18 
attention to detail 15 18 
initiative 12 18 
dependability 12 18 
accountability 13 18 
professionalism 14 18 
rule-abiding 13 18 
concentration and vigilance 11 18 
physical strength 0 1 
endurance and stamina 0 3 
physical flexibility and agility 0 3 
balance and coordination 0 6 
eye-hand coordination 0 6 
depth perception 0 6 
peripheral vision 0 6 
visual color discrimination 0 6 
visual identification 7 10 
organizational vision 0 2 
organizational awareness 10 18 
external awareness 7 1 
community awareness 9 18 
service orientation 12 18 
technology application 2 0 
information management 2 0 
human resources management 0 0 
resource management 0 0 
planning and organizing 5 8 
instructing/coaching others 0 4 
leadership 4 4 
firearms and ammunition 0 0 
control tactics, restraint/ self defense 0 1 
first response 0 0 
vehicle operation 4 2 
Table 1.   Number of Investigative/Protective Tasks Linked to an Individual 
Competency 
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Of the 59 identified competencies required at the GS-13 rate, 47 competencies are 
directly linked to at least one of the 19 identified protection tasks and 41 competencies 
are directly linked to at least one of the 15 investigative tasks. All but five of the 41 
competencies required for investigative tasks are also required for protection tasks.  
Figure 3 is a chart designed to illustrate the number of investigative and protective 
tasks linked to each competency. For example, 11 investigative tasks and 12 protective 
tasks were linked to the written communication competency. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Competencies Linked to Tasks 
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Some of the competencies linked to the most investigative tasks, such as integrity, 
linked to 15 investigative tasks, and attention to detail, also linked to 15 investigative 
tasks, were also linked to a high number of protective tasks; both integrity and attention 
to detail are each linked to 18 protection tasks.  
This did not correlate across all of the tasks. The competency of creativity and 
innovation is linked to just two investigative tasks, but to 18 protective tasks. Five of the 
competencies required for success in investigative tasks are not required for success in 
protection. Ten of the competencies required for success in protection tasks are not 
required for success in investigation. Five of the competencies required of a successful 
special agent at the GS-13 level are not required for the successful completion of either 
investigative or protection tasks.  
Not surprisingly, communication, both written and oral, was linked to a high 
number of investigative and protection tasks. Only one of the physical competencies, 
visual identification, was required for investigative tasks, while all of the physical 
competencies were required to some extent for protection tasks. 
Thirty-seven percent of the competencies are linked to 18 of the 19 identified 
protection tasks. Ten percent of the competencies are linked to 14 or more of the 15 
identified investigative tasks. It is important to note that the competency of 
instructing/coaching others is not a required competency for investigative tasks, but it is 
directly linked to four protection tasks, which would indicate that agents conducting 
protective tasks are required to instruct/coach others in protective methods and 
procedures.  
Overall, of the 41 competencies required for a special agent of the USSS at the 
journeyman grade of GS-13, to be successful conducting investigative tasks, 88% are also 
required to be successful in the performance of protective tasks. Conversely, 79% of the 
47 competencies required to be successful conducting protective tasks are also required 
for the successful performance of investigative tasks. 
It might seem to an outside observer that these two missions are little more than 
accidents of history, and no logical reason exists why the Secret Service should keep both 
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of them. However, this analysis effectively demonstrates the complementary nature of the 
two missions. It also shows that specific, definable skills needed for agents conducting 
the protective mission do exist. These skills are needed, in fact developed, and honed 
while agents conduct the investigative mission. Therefore, the Secret Service, and the 
nation’s security, is better served by keeping both missions intact. 
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VI. SURGE CAPACITY—PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES 
This chapter is designed to demonstrate the need for a cadre of trained, prepared 
and equipped special agents available for immediate deployment on temporary protective 
assignments. Protection of this nation’s leaders and visiting foreign heads of state is in 
some ways predictable and appropriately planned; for instance, the Secret Service began 
planning for the 2011 Asia/Pacific Economic Summit in Honolulu several years ago, and 
planning is already underway for the two national party conventions in the summer of 
2012. However, protectees are also often unpredictable, requiring flexibility in schedule 
and planning. National security and political concerns can cause unexpected protectee 
travel, sometimes at a moment’s notice. As discussed in earlier chapters, the majority of 
Secret Service Agents are assigned to investigative field offices. Some of these agents are 
in their first assignment, others have already completed a permanent protection 
assignment, but all of them are equipped, trained and available to support the protective 
responsibilities of the service, for those planned and unplanned events.  
As discussed in earlier chapters, the USSS is authorized by law to protect the 
president and his family, the vice president and his family, visiting foreign heads of state, 
the president-elect and the vice president-elect, former presidents and their spouses, other 
distinguished foreign visitors, certain U.S. representatives on missions abroad, and major 
presidential and vice presidential candidates. The USSS is further authorized to 
participate in the planning, coordination, and implementation of security operations at 
National Special security events, as determined by the president (United States Code, 
2003). 
The USSS maintains permanent protective details on the president and his family, 
the vice president and his family, former presidents and their spouses, the secretary of 
Homeland Security, and the Secretary of the Treasury. These details provide twenty-four 
hour physical protection, and conduct protective advances. The Secret Service also 
maintains other permanent protective support functions, such as protective intelligence 
and analysis division and technical security division and others. These details and 
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divisions are staffed with agents on permanent protective assignments for periods of three 
to five years. In FY2010, 795 Special Agents were assigned to permanent protection 
assignments. 
The irregular protection responsibilities, such as details and advance teams for 
candidates and foreign heads of state, as well as planning and coordination of NSSE, are 
temporarily staffed with agents typically drawn from investigative field office 
assignments or “the field.” In FY2010, 2,280 special agents were assigned to the field. 
These field agents provide the surge capacity needed during periods of intense protective 
responsibilities, such as United Nations general assemblies, typically held in September 
of each year, and the quadrennial presidential campaigns.  
In his April 7, 2011, testimony before Congress, the Director of the Secret 
Service, Mark Sullivan, provided the following protection statistics: 
In FY2010, Secret Service protective details and field agents ensured 100 
percent incident-free protection for 5,906 domestic travel stops and 515 
international travel stops. Foreign dignitary protection reached a record 
2,495 travel stops, including visits by 236 heads of state and government, 
and 107 spouses from over 147 countries. Dignitary protection also 
included security operations for the Nuclear Security Summit in April 
2010 and the 65th anniversary of the United Nations General Assembly in 
September 2010. Additionally, the protective mission was supported 
through the completion of 7,726 protective surveys. (United States Secret 
Service, 2011a) 
The Service’s Management and Organization Division (MNO) provides 
comprehensive analytical products and compiles a wide variety of statistics including 
reported special agent hours worked in various assignments. The following figures and 
charts were produced by MNO.  
As seen in Figure 4, the protection manhours worked by agents in field 
assignments has peaks, valleys and spikes. The spike in protection hours in February 
2002 is evidence of the NSSE events, Super Bowl XXXVII in New Orleans, LA, and the 




Figure 4.   Total Physical Protection Manhours Worked by Field Personnel (From: United States Secret Service, 2011b) 
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As the chart shows, an annual spike in protection hours worked by field agents 
occurs every September in support of the annual United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA). The exception is September  2001, at which time the UNGA was postponed to 
November due to the September 11, 2001, attacks. During the UNGA, the Secret Service 
provides protective details to over 100 visiting heads of state and their spouses. Most, if 
not all, of the protective details consist of agents drawn from the field on temporary 
assignment.  
The chart also shows increases in protection hours for the presidential campaign 
years of 2000, 2004 and 2008 over the non-campaign years of 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 
2006 and 2007. Major presidential candidates and vice presidential candidates and their 
spouses receive Secret Service protection. “As defined in statute, the term “major 
presidential and vice presidential candidates” means those individuals identified as such 
by the Secretary of Homeland Security after consultation with an advisory committee 
consisting of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the minority leader of the 
House of Representatives, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, and one 
additional member selected by the other members of the committee” (United States 
Secret Service, 2010b). As with visiting foreign heads of state, the details that provide 
candidate protection are staffed with agents from the field. 
The USSS strives for a 60/40 ratio of investigations /protection balance for field 
agents. However, increases in protective responsibilities do directly impact 
investigations. Notice in Figure 5, the increase in protection hours in FY2008, a 




Figure 5.   Summary of Man Hours Worked by Field Personnel (From: United States 
Secret Service, 2011b) 
The use of field agents for temporary protective assignments is a purposeful and 
efficient use of resources; however, an increase in protection hours worked by field 
agents also corresponds to a decrease in criminal arrests. The Secret Service made about 
400 fewer arrests in FY2008, a campaign year, than in FY2010, a non-campaign year. 
During the same period, field agents logged almost a million more protection hours in 
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Figure 6.   Arrests Versus Protection Hours FY2008-FY2010 (From: United States 
Secret Service, 2010b) 
It may be argued that the Secret Service could use agents from other federal 
agencies in those times of increased protective responsibilities, and in fact, the Secret 
Service has borrowed agents from other agencies to supplement protective duties in the 
past. This practice has had “disturbing results for the quality of protection.” The 
borrowed agents, while professional, do not have the same work experience or training 
required to be fully effective in a protective function (Melanson & Stevens, 2002, p. 153). 
Agents are sometimes deployed overnight to a disaster zone for an unscheduled 
protectee visit, or last minute news of a visiting head of state. They travel around the 
world in support of protectee visits to foreign lands, often traveling in military cargo 
planes along with armored cars and other protective equipment. Presidential campaign 
years can be a series of grueling advances, bus trips and political rallies. The continued 
irregular expansion and contraction of the protective responsibilities of the Secret 
Service, demands a supply of trained, equipped and experienced agents, ready to deploy 
at a moment’s notice. Experience has shown that the best way to maintain that supply of 
 55 
agents is to have a large cadre working on investigative missions, maintaining skills and 
providing a national service, but also available for redeployment to protective duties 
when necessary. 
 56 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 57 
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The investigative mission of the Secret Service was the reason for the inception of 
the Secret Service and it was the success and reputation of the agency that lead the Secret 
Service to presidential protection and later expansion of the protective role. It is through 
this “accident of history” (Petro & Robinson, 2005) that the Secret Service remains 
deeply and equally involved in what appears to be wholly divergent fields of endeavor. 
The Secret Service maintains that the two missions are intertwined and complementary. 
This thesis has been an exercise to determine if the investigative mission is of value to the 
now primary protective mission. This thesis sought to vindicate the Secret Service’s 
contention of the necessity of the dual missions in three main arguments. In this 
conclusion, the author first reviews the results of his analysis, and then considers what 
this analysis suggests for a new area that the Secret Service is becoming more involved 
in, cyber crime. This thesis argues that just as the investigative mission is useful for the 
Secret Service and makes its protective mission more effective, so will increased cyber 
responsibilities likely serve to complement and improve the other functions of the Secret 
Service. 
First, a case study was conducted comparing the Secret Service’s career track, in 
which agents are rotated into and out of permanent protection assignments, to the U.S. 
Army’s ARFORGEN, whose troops are rotated into and out of deployments. Just as 
ARFORGEN provides trained and equipped troops for deployments, the case study 
demonstrates the Secret Service career track meets the need for a steady stream of 
trained, equipped and available agents to rotate into the exhaustive demands of a 
permanent protective assignment as agents who have completed their protection tours 
rotate back to field office assignments. 
Second, an analysis was conducted using data gathered by the Secret Service in a 
job analysis of the special agent position. Data from this job analysis indicates many of 
the competencies needed for the successful performance of protection tasks by a special 
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agent are the same competencies required for the successful performance of investigative 
tasks. It makes sense, that if an agent is consistently successful in the investigative arena, 
that said agent would exhibit the same core competencies while performing protective 
tasks. It can be argued that skills learned in investigative assignments correlate directly to 
the success of the protective mission. 
Third, an analysis was conducted using data collected by the Secret Service’s 
management and organization division. This data included reported hours of protection 
work performed by agents not assigned to permanent protection. The analysis 
demonstrates that while these agents are not assigned to permanent protection 
assignments, they are needed, on an irregular basis, to supplement the protection of the 
nation leaders and visiting foreign heads of state. The analysis further demonstrates the 
need for a ready, trained cadre of Secret Service agents to provide a surge capacity in 
times of increased protective responsibilities. 
The criminal investigations conducted by the Secret Service are important to the 
nation’s financial infrastructure, and provide a real community impact with arrests and 
fraud prevention, but could arguably be folded into another agency’s jurisdiction. 
However, through what may be organizational foresight or another accident of history, 
the Secret Service’s foray into cybercrime over the past two decades has produced a 
protective benefit.  
As the world has become interconnected and reliant upon computer systems for 
everything from power supply to elevator controls, it has also become vulnerable to 
attack and sabotage through the manipulation of these systems. The Secret Service has 
recognized the vulnerabilities in the U.S. financial system and has developed a robust 
cyber crime program within the investigative functions to address these issues. At the 
same time, the Secret Service has also recognized these same vulnerabilities as it 
provides protection. The Secret Service needs the ability to detect, investigate and 
mitigate threats and vulnerabilities directed at protectees and protected sites made over 
the Internet or through network systems. To meet this need, the service has developed a 
critical systems protection program using special agents trained as criminal computer 
forensic examiners. This program conducts systematic audits and technical assessment of 
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critical infrastructure and key resources that support a protected site, or event (U.S. Secret 
Service, 2011a). Without the cyber crime program, the Secret Service would not have the 
capability to mitigate some of these vulnerabilities. 
Protective Intelligence investigations could also be conducted by some other 
agency, but the Warren Commission strongly argues that: 
an organization shorn of its power to investigate all possibilities of danger 
to the President and becoming merely the recipient of information 
gathered by others would become limited solely to acts of physical 
alertness and personal courage incident to its responsibilities. So 
circumscribed, it could not maintain the esprit de corps or the necessary 
alertness for this unique and challenging responsibility. (Commission, 
1964, p. 435)  
Other unintended benefits have been realized from the dual missions of the Secret 
Service as it has been able to leverage knowledge gathered in the study of assassins in 
efforts to combat school violence and workplace sabotage. The groundbreaking ECSP 
discussed in the overview chapter yielded methodology used in a number of studies to 
further the field of threat assessment to schools and even the business world. After the 
shooting at Columbine High School in Colorado in 1999, the USSS partnered with the 
U.S. Department of Education to study the thinking and behavior of school attackers in 
an effort to “ identify information that could be obtainable or “knowable” prior to an 
attack” (Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, Borum, & Modzeleski, 2004). This study was based on 
the research methods used to formulate the ECSP. This partnership resulted in the 
publication of The Final Report and Findings of the Safe Schools Initiative and Threat 
Assessment in Schools and others.  
In 2001, the USSS collaborated with CERT at Carnegie Mellon University in 
Pittsburgh, PA in an “effort to identify, assess and manage threats to and vulnerabilities 
of data and critical systems” (CERT, 2008). This collaboration developed into the Insider 
Threat Study (ITS). The ITS applies the same research methodology used in the ECSP. 
“A particular focus of the study is to identify information that may have been discernable 
prior to the incident from both a behavioral and technical perspective” (CERT, 2008). 
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The Secret Service relies on the support of other federal, state and local agencies 
in the protection of this nation’s leaders. The intelligence community provides threat 
information, the military provides air transportation and communications, and state and 
local police provide motorcade and site security to supplement to protective details. As 
another added benefit of the investigative mission, the service establishes relationships 
with these other agencies through the conduct of criminal investigations. These 
longstanding relationships allow for better cooperation during protective events. 
“Through conducting criminal investigations, special agents develop relationships with 
local, state and federal law enforcement partners that prove critical when the President, 
Vice President, or other protectees visit their district. These relationships also enhance 
investigations into protective intelligence investigations against Secret Service 
protectees” (United States Secret Service, 2011b, p. 8). 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The investigative mission of the Secret Service has changed many times. 
Beginning with the suppression of counterfeiting in 1865, the Secret Service has 
investigated public corruption, combated fraud and financial crimes, and conducted 
counterintelligence activities. The types of investigations performed by the Secret 
Service, while they should be substantive and worthwhile of their own accord, are not as 
important as the experiential learning, respite from the hyper-vigilance of protection, and 
surge capacity provided by the investigative mission.  
Certain competencies learned and practiced by special agents while conducting 
criminal investigations lend themselves to skills needed for the protective mission of the 
Secret Service. Agents learn their craft through experiential learning of investigations and 
conduct of protective advances, while under the tutelage of more senior detail agents or 
field supervisors.  
The protective responsibilities of an agent assigned to a protective detail require a 
high level of performance throughout each work shift. Much like the need of the military 
to rotate troops out of combat, the Secret Service must rotate agents out of permanent 
protective assignments for respite. 
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The professional liaison and partnerships developed by agents in the field while 
conducting investigations directly contribute to the successful partnerships required for 
the protective mission in a locality. The additional manpower in the field, not assigned to 
a permanent protective detail, provides for a surge capacity of highly trained and 
experienced agents in times of extraordinary protection requirements.  
Further study may be needed to determine if financial and cyber crimes 
investigations should continue to be included within the jurisdiction of the Secret Service. 
Certainly continued work in cyber security and critical infrastructure protection fit well 
within the mandates of the DHS. Regardless of the type of investigation conducted, the 
Secret Service requires a robust, well-funded and substantial investigative mission to 
continue to provide protection properly to this nation’s leaders.  
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